Digital Signatures, Public Key Certificates, X509

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Digital Signatures: The Problem

• Real-life examples for signatures:

- A person pays by credit card and signs a bill; the seller verifies that the signature on the bill is the same with the signature on the card
- · Contracts: are valid if they are signed.
- Can we have a similar service in the electronic world?

Digital Signatures

- Digital Signature: a data string which associates a message with some originating entity.
- Digital Signature Scheme:
 - a signing algorithm: takes a message and a (private) signing key, outputs a signature
 - a verification algorithm: takes a (public) key verification key, a message, and a signature
- Provides:
 - Authentication
 - Data integrity
 - Non-Repudiation

Digital Signatures and Hash

- Digital signatures are generally used with hash functions, hash of a message is signed, instead of the message.
 - Since public key encryption is costly, signing hash digest is more efficient than signing the whole message.
 - So, a digital signature generally uses
 - A hash function: MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD
 - A public key encryption algorithm: RSA, El-gamal

RSA Signatures

Key generation (as in RSA encryption):

- Select 2 large prime numbers of about the same size, p and q
- Compute n = pq
- Since p and q are prime, $\varphi(n) = (q 1)(p 1)$
- Select a random integer e, $~I < e < \phi,$ such that $gcd(e,\phi~(n))$ = ~I
- Compute d, $I \le \phi(n)$, such that $ed \equiv I \pmod{\phi(n)}$

Public key: (e, n) Secret key: d

RSA Signatures (cont.)


Signing message M

- Verify 0 < M < n
- Compute S = M^d mod n

Verifying signature S

- Use public key (e, n)
- Compute $S^e \mod n = (M^d \mod n)^e \mod n = M$

Note: In practice, a hash of the message is signed and not the message itself.



Public-Key Certificates

- A public key certificate binds identity to public key.
- Certificates are issued and signed by an entity called public key or certification authority (CA).
- Certificates can be verified by anyone who knows CA's public-key.
- CA's private key remains secret
- CA's certificate must be accessible.
- Certificates allow key exchange without real-time access to public-key authority.

Public Key Infrastructure

- A system to securely distribute & manage public keys.
- Important for wide-area trust management (e.g., for ecommerce)
- Ideally consists of
 - a certification authority
 - certificate repositories
 - a certificate revocation mechanism (CRLs, etc.)
- Many models possible:
 - monopoly
 - delegated
 - oligarchy
 - anarchy

Monopoly Model

- Single organization is the certificate authority (CA) for everyone
- Shortcomings:
 - no such universally-trusted organization
 - requires everyone to authenticate physically with the same CA
 - $^{\circ}\;$ compromise recovery is difficult (due to single embedded public key)
 - once established, CA can abuse its position (excessive pricing, etc.)
 - requires perfect security at CA
- CA may trust registration authorities (RAs) to check identities in order to do the initial authentication
 - Solves the problem of physically meeting the CA.

Delegated CAs

- Root CA certifies lower-level CAs to certify others
- All verifiers trust the root CA & verify certificate chains beginning at the root (i.e., the root CA is the trust anchor of all verifiers)
- Example: A national PKI, where a root CA certifies institutions, ISPs, universities who in turn certify their members
- Limitations are similar to monopoly with RAs



Oligarchy

- Many root CAs exists trusted by verifiers
- The model of web security
- Solves the problems of single authority (e.g., excessive pricing)
- Disadvantages:
 - n security-sensitive sites instead of one. Compromise of any one compromises the whole system
 - $^\circ\;$ users can easily be tricked into trusting fake CAs. (depending on implementation)

Anarchy

- Each user decides whom to trust & how to authenticate their public keys
- Certificates issued by arbitrary parties can be stored in public databases, which can be searched to find a path of trust to a desired party
- Works well for informal, non-sensitive applications
 For example, in PGP, each person creates its public key certificate and distributes it to his/her friends

Revocation

- Mechanisms to cancel certificates compromised before expiration
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL): list of revoked certificates, published periodically (mostly daily) by the CA
- Delta CRLs: Only the changes since the last issue are published
- Online Revocation Servers: No CRL is published. Verifier queries a central server to check if a certificate has been revoked.

X.509 Authentication Service

- Part of X.500 directory service standards.
 Started 1988
- Defines framework for authentication services:
 Defines that public keys stored as certificates in a public directory.
 - Certificates are issued and signed by certification authority.
- Used by numerous applications and protocols: SSL, IPSec.

Contents of X.509 Certificates

- version (1, 2, or 3)
- serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
- signature algorithm identifier
- issuer X.500 name (CA)
- period of validity (from to dates)
- subject X.500 name (name of owner)
- subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
- issuer unique identifier (v2+)
- subject unique identifier (v2+)
- extension fields (v3)
- signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)

7

How to Obtain a Certificate?

- For a particular application, you can define your own CA (libraries like openssl provide the necessary tools)
- Many companies define their own CA.
- Verisign: A company (CA) that provides certificates
 - $^\circ\,$ Commercial companies obtain certificates from CAs.
- Example:
 - See certificates accepted by your browser, if you use netscape: preferences/security and privacy/certificates

Validity of Certificates

- Certificates are valid if:
 - Signature of CA verifies
 - · Dates of the certificate are valid
 - · Certificate was not revoked
- · Certificates can be revoked before expiration if
 - user's private key is compromised
 - user is no longer certified by this CA
 - · CA's certificate is compromised
- CA maintains a list of revoked certificates, Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- Users should check certificates with CA's CRL

CA Hierarchy

- X509 entities have different CAs; in this case CAs how is a certificate verified?

 - Start with the subject
 - CAs must form a hierarchy
 - Certificate's linking members of hierarchy are used to validate other CAs
 - Each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent (backward)
 - · Each client trusts parent's certificates



Problems with X509

- Management of certificates
- Assumptions about validity of certificates:
 - detection of secret key disclosure
 - Time between disclosure and detection may be in hours or days, time needed for abuse may be counted in milliseconds
 - Owner is responsible for private key usage until requesting CA to revoke appropriate certificate
 - time delay for certificate revocation
 - time delay for distribution of revoked certificates
 - amount of data distributed periodically by CA

Problems with X509 - 2

CRL problems

- Protocols must check CRLs to make sure that the certificate is still valid
- In practice, protocols do not really check CRLs, delay between revocation and detection of revocation
- CRL is not suitable for time-critical applications
- Time-validity of CRL is typically 24 hours
 - · Validity of certificates is usually years