

# Digital Signatures, Public Key Certificates, X509

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## Digital Signatures: The Problem

- Real-life examples for signatures:
  - A person pays by credit card and signs a bill; the seller verifies that the signature on the bill is the same with the signature on the card
  - Contracts: are valid if they are signed.
- Can we have a similar service in the electronic world?

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## Digital Signatures

- **Digital Signature:** a data string which associates a message with some originating entity.
- Digital Signature Scheme:
  - a **signing algorithm:** takes a message and a (private) signing key, outputs a signature
  - a **verification algorithm:** takes a (public) key verification key, a message, and a signature
- Provides:
  - Authentication
  - Data integrity
  - Non-Repudiation

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## Digital Signatures and Hash

- Digital signatures are generally used with hash functions, hash of a message is signed, instead of the message.
  - Since public key encryption is costly, signing hash digest is more efficient than signing the whole message.
  - So, a digital signature generally uses
    - A hash function: MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD
    - A public key encryption algorithm: RSA, El-gamal

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## RSA Signatures

### Key generation (as in RSA encryption):

- Select 2 large prime numbers of about the same size,  $p$  and  $q$
- Compute  $n = pq$ 
  - Since  $p$  and  $q$  are prime,  $\phi(n) = (q - 1)(p - 1)$
- Select a random integer  $e$ ,  $1 < e < \phi$ , such that  $\text{gcd}(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
- Compute  $d$ ,  $1 < d < \phi(n)$ , such that  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

Public key:  $(e, n)$

Secret key:  $d$

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## RSA Signatures (cont.)

### Signing message $M$

- Verify  $0 < M < n$
- Compute  $S = M^d \pmod{n}$

### Verifying signature $S$

- Use public key  $(e, n)$
- Compute  $S^e \pmod{n} = (M^d \pmod{n})^e \pmod{n} = M$

**Note:** In practice, a hash of the message is signed and not the message itself.

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## Public Keys and Trust



ALICE  
Public Key:  $P_A$   
Secret key:  $S_A$



BOB  
Public Key:  $P_B$   
Secret key:  $S_B$

- How are public keys stored?
- How to obtain the public key?
- How does Bob know or 'trusts' that  $P_A$  is Alice's public key?

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## Distribution of Public Keys

- **Public announcement:** users distribute public keys to recipients or broadcast to community at large
  - For example, put the public key to your web site
  - How to ensure the announcement is not forged by an adversary?
- **Publicly available directory:** can obtain greater security by registering keys with a public directory
  - How to implement the directory?

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## Public-Key Certificates

- A public key **certificate** binds identity to public key.
- Certificates are **issued** and **signed** by an entity called public key or **certification authority** (CA).
- Certificates can be verified by anyone who knows CA's public-key.
- CA's private key remains secret
- CA's certificate must be accessible.
- Certificates allow key exchange without real-time access to public-key authority.

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## Public Key Infrastructure

- A system to securely distribute & manage public keys.
- Important for wide-area trust management (e.g., for e-commerce)
- Ideally consists of
  - a **certification authority**
  - **certificate repositories**
  - a **certificate revocation mechanism** (CRLs, etc.)
- Many models possible:
  - monopoly
  - delegated
  - oligarchy
  - anarchy

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## Monopoly Model

- Single organization is the certificate authority (CA) for everyone
- Shortcomings:
  - no such universally-trusted organization
  - requires everyone to authenticate physically with the same CA
  - compromise recovery is difficult (due to single embedded public key)
  - once established, CA can abuse its position (excessive pricing, etc.)
  - requires perfect security at CA
- CA may trust **registration authorities** (RAs) to check identities in order to do the initial authentication
  - Solves the problem of physically meeting the CA.

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## Delegated CAs

- Root CA certifies lower-level CAs to certify others
- All verifiers trust the root CA & verify certificate chains beginning at the root (i.e., the root CA is the **trust anchor** of all verifiers)
- Example: A national PKI, where a root CA certifies institutions, ISPs, universities who in turn certify their members
- Limitations are similar to monopoly with RAs

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## Oligarchy

- Many root CAs exist trusted by verifiers
- The model of web security
- Solves the problems of single authority (e.g., excessive pricing)
- Disadvantages:
  - In security-sensitive sites instead of one. Compromise of any one compromises the whole system
  - Users can easily be tricked into trusting fake CAs. (depending on implementation)

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## Anarchy

- Each user decides whom to trust & how to authenticate their public keys
- Certificates issued by arbitrary parties can be stored in public databases, which can be searched to find a path of trust to a desired party
- Works well for informal, non-sensitive applications
  - For example, in PGP, each person creates its public key certificate and distributes it to his/her friends

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## Revocation

- Mechanisms to cancel certificates compromised before expiration
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL): list of revoked certificates, published periodically (mostly daily) by the CA
- Delta CRLs: Only the changes since the last issue are published
- Online Revocation Servers: No CRL is published. Verifier queries a central server to check if a certificate has been revoked.

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## X.509 Authentication Service

- Part of X.500 directory service standards.
  - Started 1988
- Defines framework for authentication services:
  - Defines that public keys stored as certificates in a public directory.
  - Certificates are issued and signed by certification authority.
- Used by numerous applications and protocols: SSL, IPSec.

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## Contents of X.509 Certificates

- version (1, 2, or 3)
- serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
- signature algorithm identifier
- issuer X.500 name (CA)
- period of validity (from - to dates)
- subject X.500 name (name of owner)
- subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
- issuer unique identifier (v2+)
- subject unique identifier (v2+)
- extension fields (v3)
- signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)

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## How to Obtain a Certificate?

- For a particular application, you can define your own CA (libraries like openssl provide the necessary tools)
- Many companies define their own CA.
- Verisign: A company (CA) that provides certificates
  - Commercial companies obtain certificates from CAs.
- Example:
  - See certificates accepted by your browser, if you use netscape: preferences/security and privacy/certificates

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
## Validity of Certificates

- Certificates are valid if:
  - Signature of CA verifies
  - Dates of the certificate are valid
  - Certificate was not revoked
- Certificates can be revoked before expiration if
  - user's private key is compromised
  - user is no longer certified by this CA
  - CA's certificate is compromised
- CA maintains a list of revoked certificates, Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- Users should check certificates with CA's CRL

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## CA Hierarchy

- X509 entities have different CAs; in this case CAs how is a certificate verified?
  - Start with the subject
  - CAs must form a hierarchy
  - Certificate's linking members of hierarchy are used to validate other CAs
  - Each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent (backward)
  - Each client trusts parent's certificates



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## Problems with X509

- Management of certificates
- Assumptions about validity of certificates:
  - detection of secret key disclosure
    - Time between disclosure and detection may be in hours or days, time needed for abuse may be counted in milliseconds
    - Owner is responsible for private key usage until requesting CA to revoke appropriate certificate
  - time delay for certificate revocation
  - time delay for distribution of revoked certificates
  - amount of data distributed periodically by CA

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## Problems with X509 – 2

- CRL problems
  - Protocols must check CRLs to make sure that the certificate is still valid
  - In practice, protocols do not really check CRLs, delay between revocation and detection of revocation
  - CRL is not suitable for time-critical applications
  - Time-validity of CRL is typically 24 hours
    - Validity of certificates is usually years

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