
# Real-Time Communication Security: SSL, IPSEC

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#### The Internet

#### A packet-switched network:

- Data to be transmitted is divided into "packets"
- Each packet is forwarded by "routers" towards the destination




#### TCP/IP Reference Model

Application Layer (HTTP, FTP, SMTP, etc.)				
Transport Layer (TCP, UDP)				
Network Layer (IP)				
Data Link Layer (PPP, Ethernet, etc.)				
Physical Layer				

- IP: delivery of packets to the destination
- TCP: reliability of the communication
  - ordering the packets
  - error detection & recovery
  - congestion control
- UDP: basic transport protocol

## Securing TCP/IP Communications




#### Layer 3:

- can secure all IP communication transparent to applications
- must be built into the OS


#### Layer 4:

doesn't require OS modification; deployment easy

#### Different Security Models in TCP/IP



(a) Network Level



	S/MIME	PGP	SET		
Kerberos	SMTP		НТТР		
UDP	ТСР				
IP					

(c) Application Level


#### Real-Time Protocol Security Issues

- Interactive session security (unlike e-mail)
- Layer 4 (SSL)
  - Implemented on top of layer 4, between TCP & application
  - Doesn't require any modifications to OS (deployment made easy!)
- Layer 3 (IPsec)
  - Implemented between IP & TCP
  - Each IP packet authenticated separately
  - Built in the OS
  - Can secure all IP communication
  - Host-to-host application is common.
     Process-to-process also possible


#### **Perfect Forward Secrecy**

- PFS: Compromise of long-term secrets doesn't compromise session keys
- Example: Diffie-Hellman with RSA authentication
- Non-PFS examples:
  - Kerberos
  - $^{\circ}\,$  Session key transport with RSA encryption
- By-product: Escrow foilage
   Conversations can't be decrypted by authorities holding copies of long-term private keys

#### A non-PFS Protocol Example



## A PFS Protocol Example: Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature



#### SSL/TLS

- SSLv2
  - Released in 1995 with Netscape 1.1
  - Key generation algorithm kept secret
  - Reverse engineered & broken by Wagner & Goldberg
- SSLv3
  - Fixed and improved, released in 1996
  - Public design process
- PCT: Microsoft's version of SSL
- TLS: IETF's version

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#### SSL Architecture

	/				
SSL Handshake Protocol	SSL Change Cipher Spec. Protocol	SSL Alert Protocol	HTTP, etc.		
SSL Record Protocol					
ТСР					
IP					


- Record Protocol: Message encryption/authentication
- Handshake Protocol: Identity authentication & key exchange
- Alert Protocol: Error notification (cryptographic or otherwise)
- Change Cipher P.: Activate the pending crypto suite

#### Handshake Protocol

- Negotiate Cipher-Suite Algorithms
  - Symmetric cipher to use
  - Key exchange method
  - Message digest function
- Establish the shared master secret
- Optionally authenticate server and/or client



#### Basic SSL/TLS Handshake Protocol



#### **Key Computation**

- "pre-master key": S
- "master key":  $K = f(S, R_A, R_B)$
- For each connection, 6 keys are generated from K and the nonces. (3 keys for each direction: encryption, authentication/integrity, IV)

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## SSL Session Establishment

- association between a client and a server;
- created by the Handshake Protocol;

Session and Connection

- defines secure cryptographic parameters that can be shared by multiple connections.
- Connection:

Session:

- end-to-end reliable secure communication:
- every connection is associated with a session.


- Client authentication: Bob can optionally send "certificate request" in message 2.
- Session vs. Connection: "Sessions" are relatively long-lived. Multiple "connections" (TCP) can be supported under the same SSL session. (designed for HTTP 1.0)
- To start a connection, Alice can send an existing session ID.
- If Bob doesn't remember the session ID Alice sent, he responds with a different value.



- Crypto suite: A complete package specifying the crypto to be used. (encryption algorithm, key length, integrity algorithm, etc.)
  - ~30 predefined standard cipher suites.
  - Confidentiality: Achieved by encryption using DES, 3DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA.
  - Integrity: Achieved by computing a MAC and send it with the message; MD5, SHA1.
  - Key exchange: relies on public key encryption.
- Selection:
  - v2:Alice proposes a set of suites; Bob returns a subset of them;
     Alice selects one. (which doesn't make much sense)
  - v3:Alice proposes a set of suites; Bob selects one.

#### SSL Record Protocol

 Provides confidentiality and message integrity using shared keys established by the Handshake Protocol



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#### **IPsec**

- Cryptographic protection of the IP traffic, transparent to the user
- Main components:
  - Internet Key Exchange (IKE): IPsec key exchange protocol
  - Authentication Header (AH): Authentication of the IP packet
  - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Encryption/authentication of the IP packet

#### Uses of IPsec

- Can be used to provide user-, host-, or network-level protection (the granularity)
- Protocol modes:
  - Transport mode: Host applies IPsec to transport layer packet
  - Tunnel mode: Gateway applies IPsec to the IP packet of a host from the network (IP in IP tunnel)
- Typical uses:
  - Remote access to network (host-to-gateway)
  - Virtual private networks (gateway-to-gateway)



- Security Policy Database
  - Specifies what kind of protection should be applied to packets (according to source-destination address, port numbers, UserID, data sensitivity level, etc.)
- Security Association (SA)
  - An IPsec-protected connection (one-way)
  - Specifies the encryption/auth. algorithm, key, etc.
  - Identified by
    - security parameter index (SPI)
    - · destination IP address
  - protocol identifier (AH or ESP)
  - SAs are stored in SA databases
    - · AH information (auth. algorithm, key, key lifetime, etc.)
    - ESP information (auth./encryption algorithm, key, key lifetime, etc.)
    - · Lifetime of the SA

#### **IPsec Packet Processing**

#### Outbound packets:

- The proper SA is chosen from the security policy database
- From the SA database, the SPI and SA parameters are retrieved
- The IPsec protection is performed; packet passed to IP

#### Inbound packets:

- By the SPI, the SA is found
- IPsec auth./decryption is performed
- Packet passed to upper layer protocol

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#### History of IKE


- Early contenders:
  - Photuris: Authenticated DH with cookies & identity hiding
  - SKIP: Authenticated DH with long-term exponents
- ISAKMP:
  - A protocol specifying only payload formats & exchanges (i.e., an empty protocol)
  - $^{\circ}\,$  Adopted by the IPsec working group
- Oakley: Modified Photuris; can work with ISAKMP
- IKE: A particular Oakley-ISAKMP combination

#### Authentication Header (AH)

0	1	2	3			
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1			
+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+			
Next Header	Payload Len	RESER	VED			
+-						
Security Parameters Index (SPI)						
+-						
Sequence Number Field						
+-						
1			1			
+	Authentication	Data (variable)	1			
1			1			

- Auth. alg.: HMAC (with MD5, SHA1, etc.) CBC-MAC (3DES, RC5, AES, etc.)
- Typically, IV is included in the payload
- Authentication covers immutable fields of IP header as well as the payload.

#### AH with IPv4



### **Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)**

- Encryption: usually a block cipher in CBC mode
- IV is typically included in the payload (not encrypted)

#### **ESP** with IPv4