


Real-Time Communication Security: SSL, IPSEC

Ahmet Burak Can Hacettepe University abc@hacettepe.edu.tr



A packet-switched network:

- · Data to be transmitted is divided into "packets"
- Each packet is forwarded by "routers" towards the destination



TCP/IP Reference Model

Application Layer (HTTP, FTP, SMTP, etc.)		
Transport Layer (TCP, UDP)		
Network Layer (IP)		
Data Link Layer (PPP, Ethernet, etc.)		
Physical Layer		

- IP: delivery of packets to the destination
- TCP: reliability of the communication
 - ordering the packets
 - · error detection & recovery
- congestion control
- UDP: basic transport protocol

Securing TCP/IP Communications

Layer 4 (SSL/TLS) Layer 3 (IPsec)	→	Application L.
		Transport L.
		Network L.
		Data Link L.
		Physical L.

Laver 3:

- can secure all IP communication transparent to applications
- must be built into the OS

Layer 4:


doesn't require OS modification; deployment easy

Different Security Models in TCP/IP



(a) Network Level





(b) Transport Level

(c) Application Level

Real-Time Protocol Security Issues

- Interactive session security (unlike e-mail)
- Layer 4 (SSL)
 - Implemented on top of layer 4, between TCP & application
 - Doesn't require any modifications to OS (deployment made easy!)
- Layer 3 (IPsec)
 - Implemented between IP & TCP
 - Each IP packet authenticated separately
 - Built in the OS
 - · Can secure all IP communication
- Host-to-host application is common.
 Process-to-process also possible

6




Perfect Forward Secrecy

- PFS: Compromise of long-term secrets doesn't compromise session keys
- Example: Diffie-Hellman with RSA authentication
- Non-PFS examples:
 - Kerberos
 - Session key transport with RSA encryption
- By-product: Escrow foilage
 Conversations can't be decrypted by authorities holding copies of long-term private keys




A non-PFS Protocol Example





A PFS Protocol Example: Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature





SSL/TLS

- SSLv2
 - Released in 1995 with Netscape 1.1
 - Key generation algorithm kept secret
 - Reverse engineered & broken by Wagner & Goldberg
- SSLv3
 - Fixed and improved, released in 1996
 - Public design process
- PCT: Microsoft's version of SSL
- TLS: IETF's version

SSL Architecture

	/		
SSL Handshake Protocol	SSL Change Cipher Spec. Protocol	SSL Alert Protocol	HTTP, etc.
SSL Record Protocol			
ТСР			
IP			

- Record Protocol: Message encryption/authentication
- Handshake Protocol: Identity authentication & key exchange
- Alert Protocol: Error notification (cryptographic or otherwise)
- Change Cipher P.: Activate the pending crypto suite



Handshake Protocol


- Negotiate Cipher-Suite Algorithms
 - Symmetric cipher to use
 - Key exchange method
 - Message digest function
- Establish the shared master secret
- Optionally authenticate server and/or client



- 1



Basic SSL/TLS Handshake Protocol



Key Computation

- "pre-master key": S
- "master key": $K = f(S, R_A, R_B)$
- For each connection, 6 keys are generated from K and the nonces. (3 keys for each direction: encryption, authentication/integrity, IV)

14



Session and Connection

Session:

- association between a client and a server;
- created by the Handshake Protocol;
- defines secure cryptographic parameters that can be shared by multiple connections.

Connection:

- end-to-end reliable secure communication;
- every connection is associated with a session.



SSL Session Establishment

- Client authentication: Bob can optionally send "certificate request" in message 2.
- Session vs. Connection: "Sessions" are relatively long-lived. Multiple "connections" (TCP) can be supported under the same SSL session. (designed for HTTP 1.0)
- To start a connection, Alice can send an existing session ID.
- If Bob doesn't remember the session ID Alice sent, he responds with a different value.

15

Negotiating Crypto Suites

- Crypto suite: A complete package specifying the crypto to be used. (encryption algorithm, key length, integrity algorithm, etc.)
 - ~30 predefined standard cipher suites.
 - Confidentiality: Achieved by encryption using DES, 3DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA.
 - Integrity: Achieved by computing a MAC and send it with the message; MD5, SHA1.
 - Key exchange: relies on public key encryption.


• Selection:

- v2:Alice proposes a set of suites; Bob returns a subset of them;
 Alice selects one. (which doesn't make much sense)
- v3:Alice proposes a set of suites; Bob selects one.



SSL Record Protocol

 Provides confidentiality and message integrity using shared keys established by the Handshake Protocol



17



IPsec

- Cryptographic protection of the IP traffic, transparent to the user
- Main components:
 - Internet Key Exchange (IKE): IPsec key exchange protocol
 - Authentication Header (AH): Authentication of the IP packet
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Encryption/authentication of the IP packet

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Uses of IPsec

- Can be used to provide user-, host-, or network-level protection (the granularity)
- Protocol modes:
 - Transport mode: Host applies IPsec to transport layer packet
 - Tunnel mode: Gateway applies IPsec to the IP packet of a host from the network (IP in IP tunnel)
- Typical uses:
 - Remote access to network (host-to-gateway)
 - · Virtual private networks (gateway-to-gateway)

20



Security Association & Policy

• Security Policy Database

Specifies what kind of protection should be applied to packets (according to source-destination address, port numbers, UserID, data sensitivity level, etc.)

- Security Association (SA)
 - An IPsec-protected connection (one-way)
 - Specifies the encryption/auth. algorithm, key, etc.
 - · Identified by
 - · security parameter index (SPI)
 - destination IP address
 - protocol identifier (AH or ESP)
 - SAs are stored in SA databases
 - · AH information (auth. algorithm, key, key lifetime, etc.)
 - ESP information (auth./encryption algorithm, key, key lifetime, etc.)
 - · Lifetime of the SA

21



IPsec Packet Processing

Outbound packets:

- The proper SA is chosen from the security policy database
- From the SA database, the SPI and SA parameters are retrieved
- The IPsec protection is performed; packet passed to IP

Inbound packets:

- By the SPI, the SA is found
- IPsec auth./decryption is performed
- Packet passed to upper layer protocol

History of IKE

- · Early contenders:
 - Photuris: Authenticated DH with cookies & identity hiding
 - SKIP: Authenticated DH with long-term exponents
- ISAKMP:
 - A protocol specifying only payload formats & exchanges (i.e., an empty protocol)
 - Adopted by the IPsec working group
- Oakley: Modified Photuris; can work with ISAKMP
- IKE: A particular Oakley-ISAKMP combination



Authentication Header (AH)

0	1	2		3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 0 1 2	3 4 5 6 7 8	8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-	-+-+-+-+-+-+		-+-+-+
Next Header	Payload Len	RESE	ERVED	1
+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-		-+-+-+
Security Parameters Index (SPI)				
+-				
Sequence Number Field				
+-				
1				1
+	Authentication	Data (variable)		1
1				1

- Auth. alg.: HMAC (with MD5, SHA1, etc.) CBC-MAC (3DES, RC5, AES, etc.)
- Typically, IV is included in the payload
- Authentication covers immutable fields of IP header as well as the payload.

23

2

AH with IPv4

	BEFORE APPLYING AH
IPv	4 orig IP hdr (any options) TCP Data
	AFTER APPLYING AH
IPv4	orig IP hdr
	< authenticated> except for mutable fields



0	1	2	3	
0 1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4	5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	8 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1	
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	
I	Security Parame	ters Index (SPI)	1	^Authentication
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	Coverage
I	Sequence	Number	1	1
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	
I	Payload Da	ta (variable)	1	1 ^
~			~	1 1
I			1	Encryption
+	+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	Coverage
I	Padding (0-255 bytes)	1	1 1
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	1 1
I		Pad Length	Next Header	v v
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+	
I	Authenticatio	n Data (variable)	1	
~			~	
1			1	

- Encryption: usually a block cipher in CBC mode
- IV is typically included in the payload (not encrypted)



ESP with IPv4

IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | |(any options)| TCP | Data | AFTER APPLYING ESP IPv4 |orig IP hdr | ESP | | ESP | ESP| | (any options) | Hdr | TCP | Data | Trailer |Auth| |<---- encrypted ---->| |<---->|

BEFORE APPLYING ESP