



# Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes

Ahmet Burak Can

Hacettepe University

abc@hacettepe.edu.tr



# Security Services

- ✓ Confidentiality : Symmetric encryption solves
- Integrity
- Authentication
- Non-repudiation
- Access control
- Availability




# Integrity in Networking

- Sender computes a CRC for the message
- Sender appends the CRC code to the message and sends them to the receiver
- The receiver computes the CRC of the message.
  - If the CRC appended to the message is equal to the computed one, the message is unchanged with a **high probability**.
  - If the CRCs do no match, the message is changed during the transmission.

# CRC Checksum in Networking

Sender


Receiver



# Cryptographic Hash Functions

- Maps an arbitrary length input to a fixed-size output.
  - If  $m$  is message,  $H$  is the hash function,  $H(m)$  is the output of hash function, also called **message digest**.
- Desirable features:
  - **One-way**: There should be no easy way to guess  $m$  from  $H(m)$
  - **Pseudorandom**: If  $m$  and  $m'$  are two close values,  $H(m)$  and  $H(m')$  should not be close each other.
  - **Collision resistant**: It should be hard to find two inputs that hash to the same output
    - It should be hard to find two inputs  $a$  and  $b$  such that  $H(a) = H(b)$

# Example Operation of Hash Functions




# Birthday Paradox

- **Birthday Problem (“paradox”)**: When  $\sqrt{N}$  or more are chosen randomly from a domain of  $N$ , there is a significant chance of collision.
- Probability of  $n$  persons having different birthdays:

$$p(n) = 1 \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{365}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{2}{365}\right) \times \dots \times \left(1 - \frac{n-1}{365}\right)$$

# Birthday Paradox






# Collision Resistance

- If a hash function produces  $N$  bits of output, an attacker should not easily find a collision by performing less than (on average)  $2^{N/2}$  hash operations.
  - If there is an easier method than this brute force attack, it is typically considered a flaw in the hash function
  - Therefore, hash output size  $\geq 128$  bits is desirable.
- But why “collision resistance”?
  - A chosen plaintext attack: Trudy is Alice’s secretary. Generates two opposite messages.

# Internals of a Hash Function

- A fixed-size “compression function”.
  - Each iteration mixes an input block with the previous output.



- Design:
  - Lots of operations (rotations,  $\oplus$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ ,  $+$ , ...) fast in s/w.
  - More of them are added if a weakness is found.

# Some Popular Hash Algorithms

- MD5 (Rivest)
  - 128-bit output
  - Most popular
- SHA-1 (NIST-NSA)
  - US gov't standard
  - 160-bit output
- RIPEMD-160
  - Euro. RIPE project.
  - 160-bit output

Algorithm	Speed (MByte/s.)
MD5	205
SHA-1	72
RIPEMD-160	51

Crypto++ 5.1 benchmarks, 2.1 GHz P4

# Message Authentication Codes (MAC)

- A simple message integrity checking method:
  - Compute  $H(m)$  and send  $(m, H(m))$
  - The receiver computes  $H(m)$  and compares with the received  $H(m)$  value.
- What happens if an attacker changes both  $m$  and  $H(m)$  value and sends  $(m', H(m'))$  to receiver?
- A secret key system can be used to generate a cryptographic checksum known as a **message authentication code (MAC)**.
  - It is also referred as MIC (Message Integrity Code).

# MACs

- Let  $\text{MAC}_K(m)$  be a message authentication code for  $m$  produced by using  $K$ .
- An attacker shouldn't be able to generate a valid  $(m, \text{MAC}_K(m))$ , even after seeing many valid message-MAC pairs.
- It aims to protect against undetected modifications on messages, not the contents.
  - Sender of a message  $m$  computes  $\text{MAC}_K(m)$  and appends it to the message
  - Verification: The receiver also computes  $\text{MAC}_K(m)$  & compares to the received value.

# MACs from Hash Functions

- prefix:  $\text{MAC}_K(m) = H(K \parallel m)$ 
  - not secure; extension attack.
- suffix:  $\text{MAC}_K(m) = H(m \parallel K)$ 
  - mostly ok; problematic if H is not collision resistant.
- send half of the digest
- envelope:  $\text{MAC}_K(m) = H(K_1 \parallel m \parallel K_2)$
- HMAC:  $\text{MAC}_K(m) = H(K_2 \parallel H(K_1 \parallel m))$ 
  - provably secure; popular in Internet standards.